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Abstract
Based on the notion of equilibrium of a coalition P relatively to a coalition K, of
Berge, Zhukovskii has introduced Berge equilibrium as an alternative solution to
Nash equilibrium for non cooperative games in normal form. The essential advan-
tage of this equilibrium is that it does not require negotiation of any player with
the remaining players, which is not the case when a game has more than one Nash
equilibrium. The problem of existence of Berge equilibrium is more difficult (com-
pared to that of Nash). This paper is a contribution to the problem of existence
and computation of Berge equilibrium of a non cooperative game. Indeed, using
the g-maximum equality, we establish the existence of a Berge equilibrium of a non
cooperative game in normal form. In addition, we give sufficient conditions for the
existence of a Berge equilibrium which is also a Nash equilibrium. This allows us
to get equilibria enjoying the properties of both concepts of solution. Finally, using
these results, we provide two methods for the computation of Berge equilibria: the
first one computes Berge equilibria; the second one computes Berge equilibria which
are also Nash equilibria.
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1 Introduction
Based on the notion of equilibrium for a coalition P with respect to a coalition
K introduced by Berge in 1957 [6], Zhukovskii introduced the Berge Equilib-
rium [24]. This equilibrium can be used as an alternative solution when Nash
equilibrium [16] does not exist. In addition to this, it does not require negoti-
ation or coordination between players in the case where there are many Nash
equilibria. In this equilibrium each player chooses his strategy without con-
sulting the others, he obtains the maximum payoff if the situation is favorable
for him: by obligation or willingness, the other players choose favorable for
him strategies.
Zhukovskii [23] has investigated the problem of existence of Berge equilibrium
in the case of two person games and for some differential linear quadratic
games. Gaidov wrote a pair of short papers ([10], [11]) in stochastic differ-
ential games. The volume entitled ”Multicriteria Dynamical Problems Under
Uncertainty”, a Collection of Scientific Works, published in Orekhovo-Zuevo,
contains three papers on different aspects of Berge equilibrium: existence the-
orems [9], Berge equilibrium in difference differential games [7] and Berge
equilibrium in bi-matrix games [12]. Radjef [20] have also studied the problem
of existence of this equilibrium. In all the mentioned works the set of play-
ers is assumed to be finite and no procedure for the computation of Berge
equilibrium is proposed.
In [1], [2], [3] and [4] Abalo and Kostreva generalize the Zhukovkii’s defini-
tion of Berge equilibrium. They also provide a theorems of existence of this
equilibrium in the case of infinite set of players as Theorems 2, 3 in paper [2],
Theorems 3.1, 3.2 in paper [1], Theorems 2, 3 in paper [3] and Theorems 3.2,
3.4 in paper [4]. It is to be noted that these theorems are based on an earlier
paper of Radjef [20] providing an existence theorem of Berge equilibrium in
the sense of Zhukovskii [24]. After a deep investigation we have found that
the assumptions given in the Abalo and Kostreva’s Theorem are not sufficient
for the existence of Berge equilibrium in the sense of Zhukovskii. The same
remark can be made for the Radjef’s Theorem. Indeed, we provide a simple
game that verifies the assumptions of Abalo and Kostreva’s Theorem without
Berge equilibrium in the sense of Zhukovskii, which is a particular case of
Berge equilibrium in the sense of Abalo and Kostreva.
In this paper we provide general sufficient conditions for the existence of Berge
equilibrium when the set of players may be infinite countable. Next, we pro-
vide a procedure for its computation. We also provide sufficient conditions
for the existence of Berge equilibrium that is also Nash equilibrium (Berge
Nash equilibrium) and a method for its computation. Our approach is totally
different from the existing ones, we use the g-maximum equality theorem [17].
2
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we recall the different defini-
tions of Berge equilibrium and some of its properties. In Section 3 we provide
sufficient conditions for its existence and we establish the existence of Berge-
Nash equilibrium. Then from these two results, we derive two procedures for
the determination of this equilibrium. We end the paper with a conclusion.
2 Different Definitions of Berge Equilibrium
Consider the following non cooperative game in normal form
G = (Xi, fi)i∈I . (2.1)
where I is the set of players, which we assume to be finite or infinite countable;
X =
∏
i∈I
Xi is the set of strategy profiles of the game, where Xi is the set of
strategies of player i; Xi ⊂ Ei, Ei is a vector space; fi : X −→ R is the payoff
function of player i.
In this game the aim of each player is to maximize his objective function.
Let = denote the set of all coalitions (i.e., nonempty subsets of I). For each
coalition R ∈ =, we denote by −R; the set −R = {i ∈ I such that i /∈ R}:
the remaining of coalition R, if R is reduced to a singleton {i}, we denote
then by −i the set of −R. We also denote by XR = ∏
i∈R
Xi the set of strategies
of the players in coalition R. If {Ki}i∈{1,..,s}⊂N is a partition of the set of
players I, then any strategy profile x = (x1, ..., xn) ∈ X can be written as
x = (xK1 , xK2 , .., xKs) where xKi ∈
∏
j∈Ki
Xj.
We denote by A the closure of a set A and by ∂A its boundary. Let Y0 be
a nonempty convex subset of a convex subset Y of a vector space and y ∈
Y0, we denote by HY0(y), TY0(y) and ZY0(y) respectively the following sets:
HY0(y) = ∪
h>0
[Y0 − y] /h, TY0(y) = HY0(y) and ZY0(y) = [TY0(y) + y]∩Y . Note
that TY0(y) is called tangent cone to Y0 at the point y [5].
In this paper we recall the different definitions of Berge equilibrium and we give
a more general definition of Berge equilibrium in the sense that the number of
players may be infinite countable, which is not the case in the definition given
by Zhukovskii who considers the finite case only.
Definition 2.1 [24] A strategy profile x ∈ X is a simple Berge equilibrium in
the sense of Zhukovskii of the game (2.1) if
fi(x) ≥ fi(x−i, xi), (2.2)
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for each given i ∈ I and x−i ∈ X−i.
We can see that, the definition means that when a player i ∈ I plays his
strategy xi from the Berge equilibrium x, he cannot obtain a maximum payoff
unless the remaining players −i willingly (or obliged) play the strategy x−i
from the Berge equilibrium x. In other words, if at least one of the players of
coalition −i deviates from his equilibrium strategy, the payoff of the player i
in the resulting strategy profile would be at most equal to his payoff fi(x) in
Berge equilibrium.
Definition 2.2 ([1],[2],[3] and [4]) Consider the game (2.1).
Let R = {Ri}i∈M ⊂ = be a partition of I and S = {Si}i∈M be a set of subsets
of I. A feasible strategy x ∈ X is an equilibrium point for the set R relative
to the set S or simply a Berge equilibrium point for (2.1) if
frm(x) ≥ frm(xSm , x−Sm),
for each given m ∈M , any rm ∈ Rm and xSm ∈ XSm.
A strategy profile is a simply Berge equilibrium point if no coalition Sm in
S can profitably deviate from the prescribed profile relatively to the set of
players Rm. Indeed, if a coalition Sm deviates from its strategy xSm some
simply Berge equilibrium point x, then she cannot improve the earning of all
the players in Rm if the rest of the players (−Sm) maintains its strategy x−Sm
of the x.
If we consider Ri = {i}, for any i ∈ I. Then, it is obvious that the family
R = {Ri}i∈I is a partition of set of players I, and let Si = −i, for all i ∈ I. In
this case the definition 2.2 reduces to the definition 2.1.
Let M = I, consider Ri = {−i}, for any i ∈ I. It is obvious that the family
R = {Ri}i∈I is not a partition of the set of players I, and let Si = −i, for
all i ∈ I. In this case the definition 2.2 reduces to the following definition of
strong Berge equilibrium.
Definition 2.3 ([15]) A strategy profile x ∈ X is said to be strong Berge
equilibrium (SBE) of game (2.1), if
∀i ∈ I, ∀j ∈ −i, fj(xi, y−i) ≤ fj(x), ∀y−i ∈ X−i. (2.3)
If a player i chooses its strategy xi of a x which is a SBE, then the remaining
of the players (−i) cannot improve the earning of all his (her) players, i.e.,
this equilibrium is stable against deviation of any player of −i.
Definition 2.4 We say that a strategy profile x ∈ X is a Berge equilibrium
of the game (2.1) if
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1. ∀i ∈ I, ∀y−i ∈ X−i, fi(xi, y−i) ≤ fi(x)
2. ∀i ∈ I, αi = sup
xi∈Xi
inf
y−i∈X−i
fi(xi, y−i) ≤ fi(x).
We can see that, the first part of the definition means that when a player
i ∈ I plays his strategy xi from the Berge equilibrium x, he cannot obtain a
maximum payoff unless the remaining players −i willingly (or obliged) play
the strategy x−i from the Berge equilibrium x. In other words, if at least
one of the players of coalition −i deviates from his equilibrium strategy, the
payoff of the player i in the resulting strategy profile would be at most equal
to his payoff fi(x) in Berge equilibrium. The second part means that strategy
profile x is individually rational. In other words, for each player i ∈ I, Berge
equilibrium x yields a payoff that is greater or equal to his security level,
denoted by αi. We then say that Berge equilibrium is individually rational.
It is to be noted that, initially in the 1980s, Zhukovskii has introduced his
definition of Berge equilibrium without the condition 2 (individual rationality)
in definition 2.4. Later, he constructed examples of games that have Berge
equilibria that are not rationally individual, i.e. do not verify the condition
2 [24]. It is also important to emphasize the fact that the condition 2 of
individual rationality in definition 2.4 doesn’t appear in the papers of Abalo
and Kostreva [1-4], this is also a major difference between our work and their
results.
The concept of Berge equilibrium is totally different from the Strong Berge
Equilibrium. Indeed, the Berge Strong Equilibrium has been introduced in
1957 by Berge [6]. This equilibrium is a refinement 1 of the Nash equilibrium
[16] (see [15]), but in general, Berge equilibrium in the sense of Zhukovskii is
not a Nash equilibrium. If only one player i adopts his strategy in a Strong
Berge Equilibrium, he obliges all the other players −i to choose their strat-
egy in this equilibrium: the adoption of other strategies by any players in the
coalition −i, would provide each of them a payoff at most equal to that they
get in this equilibrium. In other words, if any player selects his strategy in
a Strong Berge Equilibrium, the other players have no other choice than to
follow him by choosing their strategies from the same Stong Berge Equilib-
rium. By contrast, if a player chooses his strategy in a Berge equilibrium in
the sense of Zhukovskii, he cannot oblige the other players to follow him; he
gets a maximum payoff if the other players are willing or obliged by some
circumstances to choose their strategies in the same Berge equilibrium.
The Berge equilibrium in the sense of Zhukovskii is rarely mentioned (not
to say used) by game theorists. One of the most important reasons for this
is that Zhukovskii published his results in Russian and within former USSR
with local publishers only, so his results are not known world wide. The first
1 For more details, see the book of Van Damme [22]
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paper published outside former USSR is [20]. The first papers published on
Berge equilibrium in well established international journals are [1-4]. As we
mentioned above, there are two main reasons that motivated Zhukovskii to in-
troduce the Berge equilibrium as an alternative solution to Nash equilibrium
[24]. The first one is the absence of a concept of solution (in pure strategies) for
games where there is no Nash equilibrium; the second one is the difficulty to
choose a Nash equilibrium in games where there is more than one Nash equilib-
rium. The Berge equilibrium can be used to study numerous non-cooperative
models, more particularly coalition games. Furthermore, on the contrary to
the Nash equilibrium, this concept allows to reach cooperative issues. Indeed,
with this equilibrium it is no necessary to introduce behavioral assumptions
to obtain cooperative issues, consequently, it becomes possible to determine
cooperation in a non-cooperative framework. This property is very important
for games like prisoner’s dilemma.
Propreties 2.1
(1) By definition Berge equilibrium is individually rational.
(2) In general Berge equilibrium is not Pareto optimal.
Definition 2.5 A Berge equilibrium which is also Nash equilibrium is called
Berge-Nash equilibrium.
It would be interesting to find sufficient conditions for the existence of Berge-
Nash equilibrium for such equilibrium enjoys the properties of both concepts
of solution at the same time.
Let us give an example of a conflict situation where Berge equilibrium is the
solution to which players will converge.
Exemple 2.1 Consider the game illustrated by the following table.
A B
A (-1.40, 0.94) (-0.99, 0.93)
B (-1.01, 0.98) (-1, 1)
there are two players I and II, and each has available two strategies. We list
I’s strategies as rows in the table, and II’s strategies as columns. This game
has no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. On the other hand, the strategy profile
(B, B) is a Berge equilibrium in the sense of Zhukovskii. The strategy A is
attractive for player I because he may get his best payoff in the game, i.e -
0.99, but in the case where player II chooses the strategy A, he gets his worst
payoff in the game, i.e -1.40. In addition, strategy B is his maxmin strategy.
Indeed, the minimum he gets by choosing A is -1.40, and by choosing B he gets
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-1.01. Thus, player I will tend to choose the strategy B. He can reach the Berge
equilibrium (B,B) in announcing that he has chosen the strategy B. Indeed, in
this case player II will automatically choose the strategy B for which he will
get his best payoff in the game, i.e 1.
3 Existence Results
In this section we establish the existence of Berge equilibrium (Definition 2.4)
and Berge-Nash equilibrium (Definition 2.5). From these results we derive
procedures for the computation of Berge equilibria.
3.1 Berge Equilibrium
In order to establish the existence of Berge equilibrium for the game (2.1), we
will use the following generalization of the Ky Fan inequality [14] established
by Nessah et al. ([17], [18] and [19]) called the g-Maximum Equality Theorem.
Let us recall this theorem.
Theorem 3.1 (g-Maximum Equality Theorem ( [17], [18], [19])) Let X be a
nonempty subset of a metric space E, Y be a nonempty, compact and convex
subset of a locally convex Hausdorff space F . Let Ω be a real valued function
defined on X × Y . Let X0 be a nonempty compact subset of X and g be a
continuous function defined from X0 into Y such that:
(1) g(X0) is a convex subset of Y ,
(2) the function (x, y) 7→ Ω(x, y) is continuous on X0 × Y ,
(3) for all x ∈ X0, function y 7→ Ω(x, y) is quasi-concave on Y ,
(4) for all g(x) ∈ ∂g(X0) and for all y ∈ Y , there exists z ∈ Zg(X0)(g(x))
such that Ω(x, y) ≤ Ω(x, z).
Then, there exists x ∈ X0 such that
sup
y∈Y
Ω(x, y) = Ω(x, g(x)). (3.1)
We have the following Lemmas which we will need thereafter.
Lemma 3.1 [8] A product of convex sets is a convex set.
Lemma 3.2 [21] A finite or countable product of metric spaces is a metric
space.
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Lemma 3.3 [21] A product of locally convex spaces is a locally convex space.
Lemma 3.4 [13] A Hausdorff topological vector space, locally convex and lo-
cally bounded is a normable space.
Let us consider the following set
A = {x ∈ X such that αi = max
xi∈Xi
min
y−i∈X−i
fi(xi, y−i) ≤ fi(x),∀i ∈ I}. (3.2)
The set A represents the set of individually rational strategy profiles of the
game (2.1). We have the following Lemma.
Lemma 3.5 Suppose that the following conditions are verified:
1. for all i ∈ I, the set Xi is non empty, convex and compact in the Hausdorff
locally convex space Ei,
2. for all i ∈ I, the function fi is continuous and quasi-concave on X.
Then the set A defined in (3.2) is nonempty, convex and compact.
Proof.
(1) A is nonempty set.
The conditions 1) and 2) of Lemma 2.5 imply that ∀i ∈ I, αi = sup
xi∈Xi
inf
y−i∈X−i
fi(xi, y−i) exists. Since the functions fi, i ∈ I are continuous over the com-
pact X, then ∀i ∈ I, ∃x˜i ∈ Xi such that αi = sup
xi∈Xi
inf
y−i∈X−i
fi(xi, y−i) =
inf
y−i∈X−i
fi(x˜i, y−i).
Let be x˜ = (x˜1, ..., x˜n) ∈ X, we have then:
∀i ∈ I, fi(x˜) = fi(x˜i, x˜−i) ≥ inf
y−i∈X−i
fi(x˜i, y−i) = αi.
Thus A 6= ∅.
(2) A is convex in X.
Let be x and x two elements in A and let be λ ∈ [0, 1].
Let us show that λx+ (1− λ)x ∈ A.
We have x, x two elements in A, then αi ≤ fi(x) and αi ≤ fi(x), ∀i ∈ I
thus
αi ≤ min{fi(x), fi(x)}, ∀i ∈ I.
Since the functions fi, i ∈ I are quasi-concave over X, then
αi ≤ fi(λx+ (1− λ)x), ∀i ∈ I, ∀λ ∈ [0, 1].
Therefore λx+ (1− λ)x ∈ A.
(3) A is compact in X.
Since X is compact, then it sufficient to prove that A is closed.
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Let {xp}p≥1 a sequence of elements in A converging to x.
Let us show that x ∈ A.
We have ∀p ≥ 1, xp ∈ A, then
∀p ≥ 1, ∀i ∈ I, αi ≤ fi(xp).
Taking into account the condition 1) and the continuity of fi of Lemma
3.5 when p→∞, we obtain: ∀i ∈ I, αi ≤ fi(x), i.e. x ∈ A.
Let us introduce the following functions
g : A→ X̂
defined by x 7→ g(x) = (x−1, ..., x−n, ...).
Γ : A× X̂ → R
defined by (x, ŷ) 7→ Γ(x, ŷ) = ∑
i∈I
{fi(xi, y−i)−fi(x)} where ŷ = (y−1, ..., y−n, ...) ∈
X̂ =
∏
i∈I
X−i, where X−i =
∏
j∈−i
Xj, ∀i ∈ I.
Remark 3.1 For all x ∈ A, we have
sup
ŷ∈X̂
Γ(x, ŷ) ≥ 0.
We have the following Lemma.
Lemma 3.6 If for all i ∈ I, the set Xi is nonempty, convex and compact in
the Hausdorff locally convex space Ei, then the following propositions are true.
1. The function g is continuous on A.
2. If A is convex and compact, then g(A) is also convex and compact.
Proof. The fact that the function g is continuous is a consequence of its
definition and the construction of the set X̂. The compactness of the set
g(A) is a consequence of Weierstrass Theorem. The convexity of g(A) is a
consequence of the linearity of g, which can be easily verified.
The following Lemma gives the relation between Berge equilibria of the game
(2.1) and the functions Γ and g.
Lemma 3.7 The following two propositions are equivalent.
1. x is a Berge equilibrium of the game (2.1).
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2. x ∈ A and sup
ŷ∈X̂
Γ(x, ŷ) = 0.
Proof. Let x ∈ X be a Berge equilibrium of the game (2.1). The second
condition of definition 2.4 implies that x ∈ A. The first condition of defi-
nition 2.4 implies fi (xi, t−i) ≤ fi (x) ,∀t−i ∈ X−i, ∀i ∈ I, hence Γ (x, ŷ) =∑
i∈I
{fi (xi, ŷ−i)− fi (x)} ≤ 0, ∀ŷ ∈ X̂, i.e. max
ŷ∈X̂
Γ (x, ŷ) ≤ 0.
Taking into account Remark 3.1, we obtain max
ŷ∈X̂
Γ (x, ŷ) = 0.
Conversely, let x ∈ A such that max
ŷ∈X̂
Γ (x, ŷ) = 0, this equality implies ∀ŷ ∈ X̂,
Γ (x, ŷ) =
∑
i∈I
{fi (xi, ŷ−i)− fi (x)} ≤ 0. For an arbitrarily fixed i ∈ I, we have
∀ŷ ∈ X̂, Γ (x, ŷ) = {fi (xi, ŷ−i)− fi (x)}+ ∑
j 6=i
j∈I
{fj (xj, ŷ−j)− fj (x)} ≤ 0.
For ŷ ∈ X̂ such that ŷ−i is arbitrarily chosen in X−i and ŷ−j = x−j,∀j 6= i, we
have
∑
j 6=i
j∈I
{fj (xj, ŷ−j) − fj (x)} = 0. Then from the last inequality we deduce
that ∀ŷ−i ∈ X−i, fi (xi, ŷ−i) ≤ fi (x) . Since i is arbitrarily chosen in I, we
have ∀i ∈ I, ∀y−i ∈ X−i, fi (xi, y−i) ≤ fi (x), hence, taking into account the
fact that x ∈ A, we deduce that x is a Berge equilibrium of the game (2.1).
Remark 3.2 Lemma 3.7 transforms the problem of finding Berge equilibria
of the game (2.1) into a problem of finding strategy profiles x ∈ A verifying
sup
ŷ∈X̂
Γ(x, ŷ) = 0.
We will now establish the existence of Berge equilibria by g-Maximum Equal-
ity Theorem (Theorem 3.1).
Theorem 3.2 Assume that
(1) the sets Xi, i ∈ I are non empty compact and convex subsets of locally
convex Hausdorff spaces,
(2) ∀i ∈ I, the function fi is continuous and quasi-concave on X. The func-
tion Γ is continuous on A× X̂,
(3) ∀g(x) ∈ ∂g(A), ∀ŷ ∈ X̂, ∃ẑ ∈ Zg(A)(g(x)) such that Γ(x, ŷ) ≤ Γ(x, ẑ).
Then the game (2.1) has at least one Berge (Definition 2.4).
Proof. Taking into account conditions (1) and (2) of Theorem 3.2 and Lemma
3.5, we deduce that the set A is nonempty, convex and compact. The condi-
tion (2) of Theorem 3.2 implies that the function ŷ 7→ Γ(x, ŷ) is quasi-concave
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on X̂. Taking into account the conditions (1) and (3) of Theorem 3.2, from
Lemmas 3.1-3.4 and the non emptiness, convexity and compactness of A, we
conclude that all the conditions of the g-maximum equality Theorem (Theo-
rem 3.1) are satisfied. Consequently,
∃x ∈ A such that sup
ŷ∈X̂
Γ(x, ŷ) = 0. (3.3)
Then according to Lemma 3.7, x is a Berge equilibrium of the game (2.1).
Taking into account Remark 3.1 and Lemma 3.7, we deduce the following
proposition for games with a finite number of players.
Proposition 3.1 Suppose that, in the game (2.1), the set of players is finite,
i.e. I = {1, 2, ..n}, the function Γ is continuous on A × X̂ and the sets Xj,
j = 1, n are compact.
Let
µ = min
x∈A
[
max
ŷ∈X̂
Γ(x, ŷ)
]
. (3.4)
Then the following propositions are equivalent:
(1) the game (2.1) has at least one Berge equilibrium.
(2) µ = 0.
Remark 3.3 The Proposition 3.1 remains true if the set of player is infinite
countable.
Remark 3.4 If all conditions of Theorem 3.2 are verified, then the condition
µ = 0 is satisfied.
Suppose that all conditions of the Proposition 3.1 are verified.
Step 1 Determine the security levels αi,∀i ∈ I.
Step 2 Calculate the value µ in (3.4).
Step 3
• If µ > 0, then game (2.1) has no Berge equilibrium.
• If µ = 0, then the strategy profile x ∈ A verifying max
ŷ∈X̂
Γ(x, ŷ) = 0 are
Berge equilibria of the game (2.1).
Fig. 1. Procedure for the Computation of a Berge Equilibrium.
From this Proposition we deduce the method presented in Figure 1 for the
computation of Berge equilibria of the game (2.1). Note that the step 1 of this
method can be difficult: the calculation of some αi values for i ∈ I may be
difficult to achieve, depending on the form of the payoff functions.
Let us now illustrate this procedure by examples.
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Exemple 3.1 Let us consider the following game: I = {1, 2, 3} , X1 = [0,+1] ,
X2 = [1, 2] , X3 = [−1,+1] , x = (x1, x2, x3) .
f1 (x) = −x22 − x23,
f2 (x) = −x23 + x2,
f3 (x) = −x33x1 − 3x21 − x23x22.
The conditions (1)-(2) of Theorem 3.2 are verified. Let us verify the condition
(3).
a) ∀x ∈ X, with x1 ∈ X1, x2 ∈ X2 and −1 ≤ x3 < 0, ∃y = (−x
3
3
6
, 1, 0) ∈ X,
such that fi (xi, t−i) ≤ fi
(
xi, y−i
)
,∀t−i ∈ X−i , ∀i ∈ I.
b) ∀x ∈ X, with x1 ∈ X1, x2 ∈ X2 and 0 ≤ x3 ≤ 1, ∃y ∈ X, y = (0, 1, 0)
such that fi (xi, t−i) ≤ fi
(
xi, y−i
)
, ∀t−i ∈ X−i , ∀i ∈ I.
Hence, a) and b) imply
∀x ∈ X, ∃y ∈ X, fi (xi, t−i) ≤ fi (xi, y−i) ,∀t−i ∈ X−i,∀i ∈ I. (3.5)
Now let us prove that both y = (0, 1, 0) and y = (
−x33
6
, 1, 0) with −1 ≤ x3 < 0,
are in the set A.
Indeed, we have f1 (0, 1, 0) = −1, f1
(−x33
6
, 1, 0
)
= −1 and α1 = −5,
f2 (0, 1, 0) = 1, f2
(−x33
6
, 1, 0
)
= 1 and α2 = 1,
f3 (0, 1, 0) = −3, f3
(−x33
6
, 1, 0
)
= −3x63
36
and α3 = −3.
Hence both y = (0, 1, 0) and y = (
−x33
6
, 1, 0) are in the set A. Taking into
account (3.7) we deduce that the condition (3) of Theorem 3.2 is verified.
Thus, according to Theorem 3.2, this game has at least one Berge equilibrium.
From the preceding result we have
max
y−1
f1 (0, y−1) = f1 (0, 1, 0) ,
max
y−2
f2 (1, y−2) = f2 (0, 1, 0) ,
max
y−3
f3 (0, y−3) = f3 (0, 1, 0) .
Hence,
3∑
i=1
max
y−i
fi (xi, y−i) =
3∑
i=1
fi (x) with x = (0, 1, 0) which is equivalent to
max
ŷ∈X̂
3∑
i=1
fi (xi, ŷ−i) =
3∑
i=1
fi (x), i.e. max
ŷ∈X̂
Γ (x, ŷ) = 0.
Since we have proved above that x = (0, 1, 0) ∈ A, then according to step 3,
x = (0, 1, 0) is a Berge equilibrium of this game.
Exemple 3.2 Suppose that Xi = [0, 1] , i = 1, 3.
f1 (x) = x
2
2 + x1 + x3,
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f2 (x) = x1 − x33,
f3 (x) = x1 − 3x22.
We have, max
y−1
f1 (x1, y−1) = x1 + 2, ∀x1 ∈ [0, 1] .
max
y−2
f2 (x2, y−2) = 1, ∀x2 ∈ [0, 1] .
max
y−3
f3 (x3, y−3) = 1, ∀x3 ∈ [0, 1] .
µ = min
x∈X
max
ŷ∈X̂
φ̂ (x, ŷ) = min
x∈X
[
3∑
i=1
(
max
y−i
fi (xi, ŷ−i)− fi (x)
)]
= min
x∈X
(4 + 2x22 − x3 − 2x1 + x33) = 2− 23√3 ' 1, 615 > 0.
Since µ > 0 then this game has no Berge equilibrium.
3.2 Berge-Nash Equilibrium
In this section, we establish the existence of Berge equilibrium that is also
Nash equilibrium of the game (2.1), we will use the Theorem 3.1. From this
approach, we deduce a procedure for the computation of Berge-Nash equilibria.
Let us consider the following functions:
g˜ : X → X̂ ×X
defined by x 7→ g˜(x) = ((x−1, ..., x−n, ....), x) and
Γ˜ : X × (X̂ ×X)→ R
defined by (x, (ŷ, z)) 7→ Γ˜(x, (ŷ, z)) = ∑
i∈I
[fi(xi, y−i) + fi(x−i, zi)].
Remark 3.5 By definition, for all x ∈ X, we have
sup
(ŷ,z)∈X̂×X
Γ˜(x, (ŷ, z)) ≥ Γ˜(x, g˜(x)).
Lemma 3.8 The function g˜ is continuous on X. If ∀i ∈ I, Xi is convex and
compact, then g˜(X) is convex and compact.
Proof. The continuity of g˜ is obvious from its definition and the construction
of the set X̂. The compactness of the set g˜(X) is a consequence of the com-
pactness of the set X̂ (Tychonoff’s Theorem). To establish the convexity of
g˜(X), it suffices to verify that the function g˜ is linear.
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The following Lemma gives the relation between Berge-Nash equilibria of the
game (2.1) and the functions Γ˜ and g˜.
Lemma 3.9 The following two propositions are equivalent:
1. sup
(ŷ,z)∈X̂×X
Γ˜(x, (ŷ, z)) = Γ˜(x, g˜(x)).
2. x is a Berge-Nash equilibrium of the game (2.1).
Proof.
1. Suppose that sup
(ŷ,z)∈X̂×X
Γ˜(x, (ŷ, z)) = Γ˜(x, g˜(x)), i.e.
∑
i∈I
[fi(xi, y−i) + fi(x−i, zi)] ≤
∑
i∈I
[fi(x) + fi(x)], ∀(ŷ, z) ∈ X̂ ×X (3.6)
If we take y−i = x−i, ∀i ∈ I in (3.6), we conclude that ∑
i∈I
fi(x−i, zi) ≤∑
i∈I
fi(x), ∀z ∈ X, which implies that x is Nash equilibrium of the game
(2.1).
If we take z = x in (3.6), we conclude that x verifies the property 1)
of definition 2.1 and since x is a Nash equilibrium, it is also individually
rational. We conclude that x is a Berge equilibrium of the game (2.1).
2. Suppose that x is a Berge-Nash equilibrium of the game (2.1).
The fact that x is a Nash equilibrium of the game (2.1) implies
max
z∈X
∑
i∈I
fi(x−i, zi) =
∑
i∈I
fi(x). (3.7)
The fact that x is a Berge equilibrium of the game (2.1) implies
max
ŷ∈X̂
∑
i∈I
fi(xi, y−i) =
∑
i∈I
fi(x). (3.8)
The two equalities (3.7) and (3.8) imply
max
(ŷ,z)∈X̂×X
Γ˜(x, (ŷ, z)) = Γ˜(x, g˜(x))
It is to be noted that in lemma 3.9 we have deliberately omitted the condition
x ∈ A of individual rationality for it is well known that a Nash equilibrium is
always individually rational. We have the following Theorem.
Theorem 3.3 Suppose that
(1) the sets Xi, i ∈ I are nonempty, compact and convex subsets of Hausdorff
locally convex vector spaces,
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(2) the function Γ˜ is continuous on X × (X̂ × X) and the functions y−i 7→
fi(xi, y−i) and zi 7→ fi(zi, x−i) are quasi-concave on X−i and on Xi, re-
spectively, ∀x ∈ X and ∀i ∈ I,
(3) ∀g˜(x) ∈ ∂g˜(X), ∀(ŷ, z) ∈ X̂ ×X, ∃(p̂, q) ∈ Zg˜(X)(g˜(x)) = [Tg˜(X)(g˜(x)) +
g˜(x)] ∩ (X̂ ×X) such that Γ˜(x, (ŷ, z)) ≤ Γ˜(x, (p̂, q)).
Then the game (2.1) has at least one Berge-Nash equilibrium.
Proof. The conditions of Theorem 3.3 imply that the function Γ˜ verifies all
conditions of Theorem 3.1 (g-maximum equality Theorem), consequently, ∃x ∈
X such that sup
(ŷ,z)∈X̂×X
Γ˜(x, (ŷ, z)) = Γ˜(x, g˜(x)).
according to Lemma 3.9, the strategy profile x is a Berge-Nash equilibrium of
the game (2.1).
From Remark 3.5 and Lemma 3.9, we deduce the following proposition.
Proposition 3.2 Suppose that the function Γ˜ is continuous on X × (X̂ ×X)
and the sets Xj are compact. Let
β = min
x∈X
[
max
(ŷ,z)∈X̂×X
Γ˜(x, (ŷ, z))− Γ˜(x, g˜(x))
]
. (3.9)
Then the following two assertions are equivalent:
1. β = 0.
2. The game (2.1) has at least one Berge-Nash equilibrium.
Since the function Γ˜ is a series of functions, the calculation of the value β
is generally difficult, but in the case where the set of players is finite, this
Proposition can be used to verify if a Berge-Nash equilibrium exists or not.
From this Proposition we deduce the method presented in Figure 2 for the
computation of a Berge-Nash equilibrium of the game (2.1).
Suppose that the conditions of Proposition 3.2 are verified and the set
of players is finite.
Step 1 Calculate the value β in (3.9).
Step 2
• If β > 0, then the game (2.1) has no Berge-Nash equilibrium.
• If β = 0, then the strategy profiles x ∈ X verifying sup
(ŷ,z)∈X̂×X
Γ˜(x, (ŷ, z)) =
Γ˜(x, g˜(x)) are Berge-Nash equilibria of the game (2.1).
Fig. 2. Procedure for the determination of a Berge-Nash equilibrium
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Remark 3.6 If all conditions of Theorem 3.3 are verified then the condition
β = 0 is satisfied. It is interesting to notice that this Method doesn’t neces-
sitate the calculation of the values αi, ∀i ∈ I for the determination of Berge
equilibria of the game (2.1), in addition to this, the Berge equilibria found are
also Nash equilibria of this game.
3.3 Simple Berge Equilibrium Point
In this section, we establish the existence of a simple Berge equilibrium point
of the game (2.1), we will use the Theorem 3.1.
Let us consider the following functions:
h : X → X˜
defined by x 7→ h(x) = (
rm−times︷ ︸︸ ︷
(xSm , ..., xSm), m ∈M) and
F : X × X˜ → R
defined by (x, y˜) 7→ F (x, y˜) = ∑
m∈M
∑
j∈Rm
{fj(x−Sm , ySm) − fj(x)}, where X˜ =∏
m∈M
∏
j∈Rm
XjSm and X
j
Sm = XSm , ∀j ∈ Rm.
Lemma 3.10 The function h is continuous on X. If ∀i ∈ I, Xi is convex and
compact, then h(X) is convex and compact.
The following Lemma gives the relation between simple Berge equilibria point
of the game (2.1) and the functions F and h.
Lemma 3.11 The following two propositions are equivalent:
1. sup
y˜∈X˜
F (x, y˜) = 0.
2. x is a simple Berge equilibrium point of the game (2.1).
Proof. The proof of this lemma is similar to that of Lemma 3.7.
We have the following Theorem.
Theorem 3.4 Suppose that
(1) the sets Xi, i ∈ I are nonempty, compact and convex subsets of Hausdorff
locally convex vector spaces,
(2) the function F is continuous on X × X˜ and the functions ySm 7→
∑
i∈Rm
fi(x−Sm , ySm) are quasi-concave on XSm, ∀x−Sm ∈ X−Sm and ∀m ∈M,
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(3) ∀h(x) ∈ ∂h(X), ∀y˜ ∈ X˜, ∃p˜ ∈ Zh(X)(h(x)) = [Th(X)(h(x)) + h(x)] ∩ X˜
such that F (x, y˜) ≤ F (x, p˜).
Then the game (2.1) has at least one simple Berge equilibrium point.
Proof. The proof of this lemma is similar to that of Theorem 3.2.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we dealt with the problem of existence and computation of
Berge equilibrium. For the general case with an infinite countable number
of players we have used the g-Maximum Equality Theorem to derive general
sufficient conditions for its existence (Theorem 3.2 and Theorem 3.3). From
this result we deduced a method for the determination of Berge equilibria.
Using a special function we provided sufficient conditions for the existence of
Berge equilibrium, then we derived an effective procedure for its computation.
In Theorem 3.3, we established the existence of Berge equilibria which are also
a Nash equilibria. Many things remain to do in this field of research, among
them, we can mention the study of Berge equilibrium in differential games,
namely, it would be interesting to derive similar results to those of Theorems
3.2,3.3,3.4 and Lemmas 3.7,3.9 for such games.
References
[1] - K.Y. Abalo and M.M. Kostreva, Some existence theorems of Nash and Berge
equilibria. Appl. Math. Lett. 17 (2004), 569-573.
[2] - K.Y. Abalo and M.M. Kostreva, Berge equilibrium : some recent results from
fixed-point theorems. Appl. Math and Comp. 169 (2005), 624-638.
[3] - K.Y. Abalo and M.M. Kostreva, Fixed points, Nash games and their
organizations. Topol. Meth. Nonlinear Anal. 8 (1996), 205-215.
[4] - K.Y. Abalo and M.M. Kostreva, Equi-well-posed games. J. Optim. Theory
Appl. 89 (1996), 89-99.
[5] - J. P. Aubin, Analyse non Line´aire et ses motivations e´conomiques. Masson,
Paris, 1984.
[6] - C. Berge, The´orie Ge´ne´rale des Jeux a` n−personnes. Gauthier Villars, Paris,
1957.
[7] - K.A. Boribekova and F. Jarkynbayev, Equilibrium of Berge in one differential-
difference game, in Multicriteria Dynamical Problems under Uncertainty.
Collection of Scientific Works, Orekhovo-Zuevo (1991), 83-86.
17
[8] - G. Choquet, Cours de Topologie. Masson, Paris, 1984.
[9] - S.D. Dinovsky, Existence d’un point d’e´quilibre de Berge, multicriteria
dynamical problems under uncertainty. Collection of Scientific Works,
Orekhovo-Zuevo (1991), 75-77.
[10] - S. D. Gaidov, Berge Equilibrium in Stochastic Differential Games. Math.
Balkanica (N.S), 1 (1987), 25-32.
[11] - S. D. Gaidov, Optimal strategies in two-player stochastic differential games.
C.R. Acad. Bulgare Sci. 39 (1986), 33-36.
[12] - I.A. Gintchev, Method to obtain Berge equilibrium in bi-matrix games,
multicriteria dynamical problems under uncertainty. Collection of Scientific
Works, Orekhovo-Zuevo (1991), 78-82.
[13] - A. Kolmogorov and S. Fomine, E´le´ments de la The´orie des Fonctions et de
l’Analyse Fonctionnelle. Mir, Moscou, 1977.
[14] - K. Fan, Minimax inequality and application. in ”Inequalities, III” (O. Shisha
Ed.) Academic Press, New York, 1972.
[15] - M. Larbani et R. Nessah, Sur l’e´quilibre fort selon Berge. RAIRO Oper. Res.
35 (2001), 439-451.
[16] - J. F. Nash, Noncooperative Games. Annls of Maths, 54 (1951), 286-295.
[17] - R. Nessah and M. Larbani, g-maximum equality. Proceedings of the
International Conference on Nonlinear Analysis and Convex Analysis. Tokyo
(2003), 391-400.
[18] - R. Nessah and C. Chu, Quasivariational Equation. Mathematical Inequalities
& Applications, 7 (2004), 149-160.
[19] - R. Nessah and M. Larbani, Generalized g-Quasivariational Inequality.
International Journal of Mathematics and Mathematical Sciences. 21 (2005),
3373-3385.
[20] -M. S. Radjef, Sur l’existence d’un e´quilibre de Berge pour un jeu diffe´rentiel
n-personnes. Cahier Mathe´matiques, Fasc, 1988.
[21] - L. Schwartz, Analyse; Topologie Ge´ne´rale et Analyse Fonctionnelle. Hermann,
Paris, 1970.
[22] - E. Van Damme, Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria. Springer-Verlag,
New York, 1987.
[23] - V. I. Zhukovskii, Introduction to Differential Games under Uncertainty.
International Institute of research on control problems, Moscow, 1999.
[24] - V. I. Zhukovskii, Linear Quadratic Differential Games. Naoukova Doumka,
Kiev, 1994.
18
